How does this work when you're a FL resident but your employer is based in Nebraska, Colorado, and New York? Will this exemption still apply?

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I hate to harp on this, but in the article, it's stated,

"So, for example, if the employer makes its PPE rule too onerous, an employee who chose the PPE option can then select one of the other options. Because there’s a PPE option, by exclusion an employee who chooses one of the other opt-outs should not be required to wear PPE as a result of opting out of the injection policy."

Regarding the "Exclusion" premise, Are there any Florida case cites or legal doctrines which one could include to let the HR or attorneys for the company know that exclusion applies should i choose not to wear a mask by choosing one of the other exemptions ?

It seems like a hard sell to a crabby boss for me to just say, without any legal foundation on my part, that because i claimed a NON-PPE exemption , then I don't have to wear a mask by exclusion principles

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Jeff , thank you for being succinct as always ! It's still a darn shame seeing all of these employees still force masked at all the box stores, and even some mom and pops.

This seems to be the "gray area" in that the government can't tell what a private business can do, but it seems hard to prove that masking is harassment/punishment/discrimination if they are still making everyone do it, even if vaxxed.

That said, in my non-attorney interpretation, it seems that the case law dealing with bodily autonomy infringements, cited by Tannenbaum in the Green v. Alachua case, can actually apply to the private sector, so I'm wondering if we can make a legit claim that we are suffering a bodily autonomy violation in the private sector:

TANENBAUM, J. cites valid law that such right is to be free from violation by society at large, and not just by the government.

In re Guardianship of Browning,Β 568 So.2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990)


β€œβ€¦privacy has been defined as an individual's "control over or the autonomy of the intimacies of personal identity," Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 233, 281 (1977); or as a "physical and psychological zone within which an individual has the right to be free from intrusion or coercion, whether by government or by society at large." Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 671, 677 (1978).”

Another citation in his opinion states that this right to bodily autonomy and informed consent to accept or reject medical interventions is a common law right to be free from restraint or interference from others, in which such prohibitions are not limited to just government alone, hence the use of the term, β€œfrom others” - which would imply that such infringment is also prohibited in the private sector.


497 U.S. 261 (1990)


β€œAt common law, even the touching of one person by another without consent and without legal justification was a battery. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts Β§ 9, pp. 39-42 (5th ed. 1984). Before the turn of the century, this Court observed that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). This notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that informed consent is generally required for medical treatment. Justice Cardozo, while on the Court of Appeals of New York, aptly described this doctrine: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-130, 105 N. E. 92, 93 (1914). The informed consent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American tort law. See Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, & Owen, supra, Β§ 32, pp. 189-192; F. Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment, A Practical Guide 1-98 (2d ed. 1990).”

I DO RECALL our conversation at the conference regarding CRUZAN and how a judge who heard one of your cases said it wasn't applicable because it was a loss, BUT how would that square with this in the same opinion ?

"The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The court recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common law doctrine of informed consent, but expressed skepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 416-417 (Mo.1988) (en banc). The court also declined to read a broad right of privacy into the State Constitution which would "support the right of a person to refuse medical treatment in every circumstance,"

IOW, the right was not recognized limited to just the "circumstances of the case", so the common law right to refuse would likely stand otherwise, as held by Tannenbaum, which is why I'm thinking he used that citation.

So this is why I think those two cases Tannenbaum cited can make the case for mask mandates in the private sector be a legitimate bodily autonomy infringement claim.

Again, as a non-attorney, I totally repsect your opinion on this more so than mine, and hope you may have a minute to respond

-Jeff J In Tampa Bay

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